Evolutionary meta-ethics is an emerging philosophical study of the relationship between theory of evolution and evolutionary meta-ethics. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of evolutionary factors on various planes of meta-ethics, and attempt to answer this question: can theory of evolution (presumed as true) strengthen or weaken meta-ethical theories? Using a descriptive-analytic approach, the present article separates four realms of meta-ethical studies (semantics, epistemology, ontology and psychology) and comes to grips with evolutionist opinions that tried to take advantage of the theory of evolution in order to accept or reject some meta-ethical theories. The findings of the present study shows that reasons such as “principle of thrift” which evolutionist philosophers turned to so as to deny the existence or objectivity of ethical facts are not only inadequate but also ineffective, and they fall into skepticism by repudiating ethical theories and justifications and the truth of the ethical propositions.