In response to a long life question on the autonomy of morality from religion or its dependence on it, Kant, like some of his predecessors, decides the autonomy of morality from religion. But as a justification of the alleged independence, he gives a new and different answer to its predecessors, which is briefly summarized as follows: Practical reason or pure will, as the practical aspect of pure reason, has such priori concepts and elements as absolute good, duty, absolute being, the autonomy of will , goal-basedness and ... These transcendental elements have negative properties as non-empirical, non-textual, non-rational and positive features as priority, formality, generality, and essentiality, conditionality and objectivity. It is  due to these elements and characteristics that practical reason may with reliance on itself and without any dependence on anything beyond itself  referrals and based on references outside of itself, even God, be taken as the source of ethical ideass and judgments, and produced prior synthetic judgments qualified with generality and necessity; in such a way that every rational being would regard them as  meaningful, knowledgeable, authoritative and obligatory. The paper, with a descriptive-analytical method and in different ways, firstly, by extracting the previous elements of practical reason, and secondly, by expressing their positive and negative features, which Kantian scholars have known of less relevant in discussing Kant's ethics, has made an attempt to explain the how of ethics` independence from religion in transcendent philosophy.